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Although published over forty years ago, Monroe Freedman's
Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The Three
Hardest Questions' continues to reverberate through American
jurisprudence. In an effort to raise some of Freedman's questions in the
context of contemporary plea bargaining, eight lawyers were asked to
respond to the hypothetical below,2 restricting their answers to five-to-
ten "lightly footnoted" pages each.3  Professor Freedman kindly
consented to comment on these submissions, and to accept a similar limit
on his comments. The product of all their efforts is a pithy and
provocative commentary on a situation that arises all too frequently in
today's criminal courts.
You are a lawyer representing a defendant in a federal drug prosecution. The
allegation against your client is that she transported heroin into the United States
by concealing it on her person; the principal evidence against your client is the
heroin seized from her during lawful police procedures upon her arrival by air into
Tampa International Airport. Your candid assessment of the evidence against your
client is that she will very likely be convicted and sentenced to a long prison term.
In your discussions with your client, she has mentioned that she is well
acquainted with a man who is reputed to be a "drug kingpin" in the Tampa Bay
area. You know from conversations with your friends in the local federal
prosecutor's office that there is substantial interest in making a case against this
man, who has thus far eluded prosecution.
You have already generally informed your client that she might be able to
reduce her sentence if she provides "substantial assistance" to the prosecution in
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their pursuit of other lawbreakers. Should you also specifically draw your client's
attention to the government's interest in her friend, the reputed drug kingpin, even
though you know this might tempt your client to commit perjury in testifying
against him?
Assume that you have had this specific conversation with your client, and that
she subsequently agreed with the prosecution to provide detailed testimony
regarding the drug kingpin's illegal operations, in exchange for which she will
plead guilty to a reduced charge and receive a short sentence after she testifies
against the kingpin. As her attorney, you have assisted her in reaching this
agreement.
Sometime before the kingpin's trial (and thus before your client has entered
her guilty plea and been sentenced), she confesses to you that her testimony against
the kingpin will be "all lies-I figured out what those prosecutors wanted me to
say, and I'm gonna say it." You advise the client against this procedure, but she is
adamant, saying that this is the only way she can avoid a long sentence--"and
besides, I'm convinced that guy is dirty, I just can't prove it. He was too careful
around me." Assuming that you believe your client is now telling you the truth,
what are your ethical obligations?
Are you required to withdraw from representing your client? If not, are you
permitted to do so? Are you required to inform the court of her perjury? If so,
which court-the one trying the kingpin, the one to which she plans to plead
guilty, or both? If you are not required to disclose, are you permitted to do so?
And once again, to whom?
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